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Forcing or coercing victims to acquiesce to intercourse under adverse 
conditions that sufficiently undermine the voluntariness of their consent 
typically poses no conceptual problem for the law of rape. For example, a 
perpetrator obtaining intercourse by exerting physical force that overpowers 
the victim easily qualifies as rape by physical force. But the physical force 
need not even be actually exercised. Merely the credible threat of sufficient 
physical force, thus causing the fearful victim to submit to intercourse to 
avoid the threatened harm, also suffices. Either way, the resulting 
intercourse is clearly nonconsensual, unlawful, criminal rape.  
When the perpetrator obtains intercourse by a threat, almost invariably 
the threat is conditional. The perpetrator threatens the victim with physical 
harm if the victim resists, or unless the victim acquiesces to, intercourse. 
The proposal conditions the physical harm on the victim’s non-compliance. 
That is, the threat is in the form of an “intercourse or else” proposal. 
Threats of non-physical harm also may constitute rape—termed rape by 
coercion, or in the Model Penal Code’s terms “Gross Sexual Imposition.”
1
 
Though involving a non-physical harm, the threat is still conditional—
“intercourse or else.” More controversial is whether a proposal that offers a 
benefit, rather than threatening a harm, in order to obtain intercourse can be 
sufficiently coercive as to negate the victim’s consent and qualify as rape. 
But either way, the proposal is still conditional. Rather than “intercourse or 
else some type of harm,” the proposal is “intercourse or else no benefit.” 
That is, the perpetrator conditions receipt of the benefit on the victim’s 
compliance by engaging in intercourse.  
But what if the harm or threat is unconditional? Can an unconditional 
harm or threat even be understood as coercive? If the harm or threatened 
harm occurs unconditionally—regardless of whether the victim engages in 
intercourse or not—how can the victim be said to have been coerced? If the 
                                                                                                             
 * Professor of Law, the University of Tulsa College of Law. I thank the conference 
panelists, participants, and editors at the Law Review for their helpful comments and 
suggestions. 
 1. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (explaining the sexual 
offense as compelling submission to intercourse “by any threat that would prevent resistance 
by a [victim] of ordinary resolution”).  
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harm occurs whether the victim engages in intercourse or not, can the harm 
have coerced or induced or caused the intercourse? If the victim does 
engage in intercourse is it thus necessarily consensual? 
This Essay addresses the special challenge that a perpetrator’s use of 
unconditional harm or unconditional threatened harm as the means to obtain 
a victim’s acquiescence to intercourse poses for the law of rape. It first 
illustrates the conceptual difficulty by considering a case involving a 
defendant obtaining intercourse under the most brutal and horrific 
conditions imaginable. Though we might all find the defendant 
blameworthy and deserving the most severe punishment, explaining exactly 
how the defendant is legally guilty is less clear. The victim’s acquiescence 
to intercourse in the face of these horrific circumstances—precisely because 
they are unconditional—renders it surprisingly difficult to explain conduct 
we intuitively feel must be non-consensual on the part of the victim.  
After exploring whether this case and the special problem of 
unconditional harm or threatened harm may be explained under the various 
types of rape, the Essay considers the distinction between positive and 
negative sexual autonomy.
2
 It canvases the extent to which our law seeks 
not merely to protect our negative autonomy—freedom from unwanted 
intercourse—but also strives to protect our positive sexual autonomy—
freedom to engage in wanted intercourse. Our difficulty in crafting a 
satisfactory account of unconditional harm or threatened harm may be due 
to the interest accorded to a victim’s positive autonomy. If we take positive 
autonomy seriously, unconditional harm or threatened harm poses a 
                                                                                                             
 2. Negative sexual autonomy is freedom from unwanted sexual intercourse; positive 
sexual autonomy is freedom to engage in wanted sexual intercourse. Donald Dripps, a fellow 
symposium panelist who writes on consent in this issue, see Donald A. Dripps, Due Process 
Overbreadth? The Void for Vagueness Doctrine, Fundamental Rights, and the Brewing 
Storm Over Undefined Consent in Sexual Assault Statutes, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 121 (2020), is 
perhaps the first to articulate that distinction. Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on 
the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1780, 1785 (1992). For other accounts recognizing the distinction, see JOAN 
MCGREGOR, IS IT RAPE?: ON ACQUAINTANCE RAPE AND TAKING WOMEN’S CONSENT 
SERIOUSLY 111–12 (2005); STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF 
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF THE LAW x (1998) (“Respect for autonomy requires 
protecting our freedom to refuse sexual contact [negative autonomy], but it also requires 
protecting our freedom to seek emotional intimacy and sexual fulfillment with willing 
partners [positive autonomy].”); ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 125 
(2003) (stressing the importance of both dimensions of sexual autonomy—positive and 
negative—be respected and facilitated).  
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challenge. Instead, if our sole concern is protection of negative autonomy, 
the problem is defanged. Thus, the problem of unconditional harm or 
threatened harm forces us to grapple with striking the right balance between 
protecting our positive and negative sexual autonomy, between punishing 
culpable offenders and not further victimizing victims. 
I. The Challenge of California v. Hooker 
To illustrate acquiescence to intercourse obtained by unconditional harm 
or coercion, let us consider California v. Hooker.
3
 The case features 
intercourse under unimaginably horrific and repugnant circumstances that 
would seemingly pose no problems in analyzing the victim’s lack of 
consent and concluding that the perpetrator was guilty of rape. Despite our 
intuitions that the perpetrator surely deserves the most severe punishment 
available, the case does not easily fit within existing approaches to the law 
of rape.  
In Hooker, a husband and wife kidnapped the adult victim at knifepoint 
and held her captive.
4
 The victim was held naked, bound, gagged, 
blindfolded, and chained to a bed.
5
 After several years of continuing 
captivity, the husband began having intercourse with the victim.
6
 
Undoubtedly, one would believe the horrendous conditions sufficiently 
undermined the victim’s capacity to consent. While the court did in fact 
conclude that the victim’s capacity to consent was undermined, it did so in 




Rape by physical force generally occurs in either (or both) of two ways: 
when the perpetrator exerts extrinsic force that overpowers an unwilling 
victim who is powerless to prevent the intercourse or when the perpetrator 
obtains intercourse with the victim by threatening extrinsic force.
8
 Under 
the latter type, the perpetrator does not literally overpower the victim, but 
instead the victim reluctantly acquiesces via the coercion of the threat. 
Typically threats of force are conditional in nature. The recipient will be 
                                                                                                             
 3. 244 Cal. Rptr. 337 (Ct. App. 1988) (depublished).  
 4. Id. at 338–39.  
 5. Id. at 339. 
 6. Id. at 340. 
 7. See id. at 345–46. 
 8. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 33.04[B][1][d], at 577 
(6th ed. 2012) (“Forcible rape prosecutions may be based on a threat of serious force rather 
than its infliction.”).  
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physically harmed only on the condition that they do not submit to 
intercourse. If they do submit, they will not be harmed. The force is 
conditioned on noncompliance with the demand of intercourse. 
But the rape in Hooker transpired through neither of these means. The 
husband did not obtain intercourse with the victim through extrinsic force 
that overpowered her; she was not physically helpless to prevent the 
intercourse. Nor did the husband obtain intercourse via a conditional threat. 
Either there was no threat, or the threat was unconditional. The horrific 
conditions of the victim’s captivity were imposed on her regardless of 
whether she complied with any demands or submitted to intercourse. The 
husband never uttered an “intercourse or else . . .” threat. He did not 
threaten to make the conditions of the victim’s captivity any worse if the 
victim did not submit to intercourse. Nor was there any evidence of an 
implicit or unspoken threat if the victim did not engage in intercourse.
9
 
Another unusual feature of the case is that the victim factually consented 
to intercourse with the husband.
10
 As Peter Westen explains, by rendering 
the victim a captive, the husband caused the victim “to acquiesce to sexual 
intercourse by unconditionally placing her in a position in which she 
preferred captivity with sexual intercourse to captivity without sexual 
intercourse[.]”
11
 That is, the victim did not reluctantly submit to intercourse 
but rather affirmatively wanted, desired, and wished to engage in 
intercourse. The court held, and Westen agreed, that despite the victim 
desiring to engage in the intercourse, it was nonetheless rape.
12
 The victim’s 
factual consent was not legal consent. It was not legal consent in their view 




These three unusual features in Hooker—that there was factual consent 
by the victim, that the perpetrator did not exert extrinsic physical force to 
obtain intercourse, and that the perpetrator did not employ a conditional 
threat to coerce intercourse—make it conceptually challenging to satisfy the 
elements of rape by physical force. But these three features are easily 
accommodated by approaches to other types of rape: statutory rape or 
                                                                                                             
 9. For the purposes of our analysis, let us assume that the victim did not believe that 
there was an implicit threat. 
 10. PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF 
CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT 184–85 (2004). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 184–85. 
 13. Id. 
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intercourse with an intoxicated victim.
14
 In those types of rape, victims do 
not merely acquiesce but may affirmatively desire to engage in intercourse, 
but do so under conditions or circumstances that undermine consent.
15
 Just 
as in Hooker, the victim prefers being intoxicated or underage with sexual 
intercourse to intoxication or being underage without intercourse. That a 
victim might factually consent to intercourse under those conditions or 
circumstances nonetheless does not constitute legal consent. Being 




But what might make the analysis in Hooker still different is the duration 
or pervasiveness of the condition or circumstances precluding legal consent. 
It is one thing for the law to speak, in a sense, to the intoxicated person as 
follows: “We understand that you want to have intercourse now while you 
are intoxicated, but we think that is an unwise choice and one that you 
might regret when sober.” In protecting the victim’s negative autonomy—
freedom from unwanted intercourse—the harm to the victim’s positive 
autonomy is minimal. The victim need only wait until the next day to attain 
sobriety. Even for an underage person wanting to engage in intercourse, the 
constraint on positive autonomy is arguably not too oppressive. A fifteen-
year-old may only have to wait a year to attain the age of consent.
17
 But the 
victim in the Hooker case may be different. 
Unlike an intoxicated or underage victim, the kidnapping victim was 
held captive for three years before she expressed a preference for 
intercourse. True, some thirteen-year-olds might wish to engage in 
intercourse and have to similarly wait three years before they can legally 
consent. But there is still a difference between the thirteen-year-old and the 
Hooker victim. The duration of the bar to the underage person’s legal 
capacity to consent is limited and certain. The bar to the victim in Hooker is 
open-ended and potentially indefinite. Moreover, the bar might serve a 
                                                                                                             
 14. See, e.g., MCGREGOR, supra note 2, at 141 (“Consent is undermined by one of two 
general kinds of infelicities: first, internal conditions that affect the actor’s capacity to 
consent—being too young, asleep, unconscious, drunk, or high on drugs.”).  
 15. See id.  
 16. See id.  
 17. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 224–25 (“If we say that minors are unable to give 
transformative consent while they are minors, we do not preclude sexual experience over the 
course of their lives. Minors get older. By contrast, to say that retarded females cannot give 
transformative consent is to deny them permanently the opportunity to legitimately 
experience intimacy and sexual pleasure. The cost of zealously protecting their negative 
autonomy is very high indeed.”) (footnote omitted).  
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greater hardship on adult victims compared to underage victims. Adult 
victims have already attained the legal age of consent and are accustomed 
to enjoying the capacity of legal consent. In contrast, underage victims are 
not barred from something that they have previously enjoyed or exercised. 
Because of the open-ended and potentially life-long conditions rendering 
the Hooker victim incapable of legal consent, perhaps the better type of 
rape through which to understand Hooker is intercourse with a mentally 
disabled person. The mentally disabled are generally considered legally 
incapable of consent and thus intercourse with them is criminalized as 
rape.
18
 And unlike being intoxicated or underage, the basis for the 
incompetence to legally consent is open-ended and potentially indefinite, as 
with the victim in Hooker.
19
 Conceptually, the victim in Hooker might be 
more appropriately characterized as having a mental disability of sorts and 
was thus legally incapable of consenting, thereby rendering the intercourse 
rape. Rather than the mental disability being caused by internal processes in 
the brain, the mental disability of the victim in Hooker is caused by external 
circumstances—a sort of environmental or circumstantial mental disability. 
But precisely because of the open-ended and potentially indefinite 
constraint on the capacity to consent, some courts and commentators 
suggest that mental disability should not bar the legal capacity to consent.
20
 
As Alan Wertheimer argues, to declare that the mentally ill “cannot give 
transformative consent is to deny them permanently the opportunity to 
                                                                                                             
 18. See K.H. Larsen, Annotation, Rape or Similar Offense Based on Intercourse with 
Woman Who Is Allegedly Mentally Deficient, 31 A.L.R.3d 1227 (1970).  
 19. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  
 20. See, e.g., Adkins v. Virginia, 457 S.E.2d 382, 387 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (expressing 
concern that statutes protecting the mentally disabled from exploitation “must not be 
interpreted and applied in a manner that . . . would prohibit all mentally impaired or retarded 
persons from engaging in consensual sexual intercourse without having their partners 
commit a felony”) (citing New Jersey v. Olivio, 589 A.2d 597, 604 (N.J. 1991) (stressing 
“the importance of according the mentally handicapped their fundamental rights”)); 
MCGREGOR, supra note 2, at 155 (“Would we want to say that all mentally ill people cannot 
consent to sex? Wouldn’t such a sweeping rule unjustifiably deny all those with mental 
retardation and mental[] illness the right to sexual autonomy by not permitting them to 
affirmatively choose to have a sexual relationship?”); WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 224 
(“[W]e have reason to be concerned to facilitate the positive autonomy of the retarded as 
well as to protect their negative autonomy.”); see also Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape, 
and Mental Retardation, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 322 (“[M]ost mentally retarded 
individuals have the capacity to consent to sexual intercourse but . . . they should also be 
protected from harm.”).  
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legitimately experience intimacy and sexual pleasure. The cost of zealously 
protecting their negative autonomy is very high indeed.”
21
  
The same consideration of the positive autonomy of the mentally 
disabled would equally apply to the victim in Hooker. Because declaring 
the victim in Hooker incapable of legal consent would create a permanent 
ban on her enjoying the fundamental right to and “important human good” 
of intercourse,
22
 perhaps we should not declare the victim in Hooker legally 
incapable of consent. While doing so would protect her negative autonomy, 
it might too greatly constrain her positive autonomy.  
One might object that three years is too short a period of time before 
foregoing (or relaxing) the protection of our negative autonomy. But after 
three years, it perhaps appeared to the victim in Hooker that her captivity 
would continue indefinitely. So, the question becomes at what point should 
the protection of an individual’s negative autonomy be relaxed? While there 
is no clear number of years or days where the protection of negative 
autonomy disappears, ignoring the importance of positive autonomy will 
eventually cause a harm of its own. In fact, at some point, the interest in 
positive autonomy may well outweigh our interest in negative autonomy.
23
 
Ultimately, it is at that point where factual consent under adverse conditions 
that have become institutionalized or normalized may constitute legal 
consent. 
II. Balancing Negative and Positive Autonomy 
There still may be strong objections that our negative autonomy is an 
absolute value, too important to be subjected to a balancing test against 
positive autonomy.
24
 However, our present laws reflect a balance between 
                                                                                                             
 21. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 225 (footnote omitted).  
 22. MCGREGOR, supra note 2, at 113; accord SCHULHOFER, supra note 2, at 277 (“[T]he 
right to seek intimacy is important, extremely so.”); see also id. at 163 (“[S]exual fulfillment 
is a legitimate and valued goal of marriage and other ongoing, intimate relationships.”).  
 23. SCHULHOFER, supra note 2, at 237 (acknowledging that overprotection of negative 
autonomy may impair our positive autonomy—it will “bear too heavily on legitimate claims 
to privacy and sexual freedom”); id. at 272 (noting that sufficient protection of negative 
autonomy by a verbal consent rule may nonetheless impose “the cost [on our positive 
autonomy] of imposing a degree of formality and artificiality on human interactions in 
which spontaneity is especially important”); id. at 277 (supplying several examples where 
overprotection of negative autonomy impermissibly undermined positive autonomy).  
 24. Negative autonomy might well be the comparatively greater concern of the criminal 
law. MCGREGOR, supra note 2, at 112 (“The criminal law exists to protect negative sexual 
autonomy . . . .”). Nonetheless, positive autonomy should be promoted or not interfered with 
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the two forms of sexual autonomy.
25
 For example, we do not criminalize all 
intercourse undertaken when merely some alcohol has been consumed. But 
if negative autonomy were our only concern, then a rule criminalizing such 
conduct would provide better protection. Instead, we only criminalize 
intercourse when the victim is sufficiently intoxicated. True, such a rule 
weakens the protection of our negative autonomy as compared to an 
absolute ban on intercourse after even slight consumption of alcohol, but 
we view our present rule as preferable because it gives due regard for our 
positive autonomy. To illustrate this rule, consider Wertheimer’s following 
thought experiment:
26
 We can go to either of two different parties, each of 
which has different rules pertaining to alcohol and intercourse. Party 1 
forbids any party guest engaging in intercourse that night after touching 
even a drop of alcohol. Party 2 comports with our present rule that allows 
consent to intercourse if the victim is not sufficiently intoxicated. 
Wertheimer conjectures, and reports anecdotal evidence, that few would 
prefer attending Party 1.
27
  
Statutory rape law also reflects a balance between the two types of 
autonomy. Given that some studies suggest that adolescent brains do not 
become fully mature until the age of twenty-five,
28
 if we were only 
interested in protecting negative autonomy, we might extend the protection 
of our statutory rape laws to the age of twenty-five. That we do not seek 
such maximal protection of our negative autonomy suggests that positive 
autonomy also has some value. On that basis, the optimal age of consent 
reflects an appropriate balance between protecting our negative and positive 
autonomy.  
Even the ethical regulation of lawyers and clients having intercourse 
with each other reflects the attempt to strike the right balance between the 
                                                                                                             
unless it would violate someone’s negative autonomy. Id. at 111–12 (“[P]ositive liberties are 
limited only by the sovereign right of others to refuse consent. Arguably, the state should not 
block the pursuit of positive sexual autonomy except where the exercising of power violates 
another’s negative sexual autonomy.”).  
 25. SCHULHOFER, supra note 2, at 15 (“A workable notion of sexual autonomy 
[incorporating both positive and negative dimensions] appears to require compromises and 
‘balancing’ . . . .”).  
 26. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 252.  
 27. Id. at 252–53.  
 28. Mariam Arain et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, 9 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC 
DISEASE & TREATMENT 449, 451 (2013), https://doi.org/10.2147/NDT.S39776 (“It is well 
established that the brain undergoes a ‘rewiring’ process that is not complete until 
approximately 25 years of age.”) (footnote omitted). 
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two types of autonomy.
29
 If we were only concerned with protecting 
clients’ negative sexual autonomy, we might have a rule absolutely 
prohibiting intercourse with a client. Because this would too greatly 
infringe our positive autonomy, we allow it under some circumstances. 
First, while lawyers must not commence a sexual relationship with a pre-
existing client, lawyers may commence a representation of a client with 
whom the lawyer has a pre-existing (and still ongoing) sexual 
relationship.
30
 Second, lawyers in a firm may commence sexual 
relationships with their law partners’ clients.
31
 Third, when the client is an 
organization, lawyers may commence sexual relationships with some 
employees of that organizational client.
32
 Despite diminishing the 
protection of clients’ negative autonomy, these rules advance both clients’ 
and lawyers’ positive autonomy. That we do not adopt an absolute rule 
banning all of those interactions suggests that the law does seek to protect 
and advance positive autonomy as well. The law strives to attain the 
optimal balance between negative and positive autonomy.  
Similarly, most employers do not prohibit any and all intercourse 
between employees. Though such a rule would surely protect negative 
autonomy, it would too greatly infringe upon those employees’ positive 
autonomy. This is especially true given the high incidence of marriages and 
committed relationships resulting from people that meet in the workplace.
33
 
Striving to strike the right balance between negative and positive autonomy, 
it is more typical that relationships between superiors and subordinates are 
prohibited.
34
 But intercourse between employees at the same level and 
                                                                                                             
 29. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(j) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (“A lawyer 
shall not have sexual relations with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed 
between them when the client-lawyer relationship commenced.”). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. r. 1.8(k) (exempting Rule 1.8(j) from the general rule imputing conflicts of any 
lawyer in a firm to all lawyers in that firm).  
 32. See id. r. 1.8(j) cmt. [19] (“When the client is an organization, paragraph (j) of the 
Rule prohibits a lawyer for the organization (whether inside or outside counsel) from having 
a sexual relationship with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or 
regularly consults with that lawyer concerning the organization’s legal matters.”).  
 33. Lindsay Dodgson, The Psychological Reasons Why You Fall in Love with Your 
Colleagues, BUS. INSIDER (May 29, 2018, 9:17 AM), https://www.businessinsider. 
com/psychology-of-office-romances-2018-5 (citing a study that shows “22% of people meet 
their actual romantic partner at work”). 
 34. See, e.g., Shelley Frost, Romantic Relationships in the Workplace, CHRON: SMALL 
BUS., https://smallbusiness.chron.com/romantic-relationships-workplace-11804.html (last 
visited May 13, 2020) (noting that supervisor-subordinate relationships pose “the biggest 
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presumably between those employees who are married to each other 
(regardless of their respective levels) is permitted. 
Because rape law and our regulation of intercourse recognizes the value 
of positive autonomy and attempts to maintain the appropriate balance 
between negative and positive autonomy, what constitutes consent is itself a 
balance between negative and positive autonomy. That a victim says “Yes” 
to the prospect of intercourse or affirmatively desires it does not necessarily 
constitute legal consent. A person’s factual consent to intercourse if 
underage or sufficiently intoxicated, for example, does not constitute legal 
consent.
35
 Considerations of negative autonomy outweigh an interest in 
positive autonomy and bar a person’s factual consent from being legal 
consent. In these cases, protecting negative autonomy transforms factual 
consent into legal non-consent.  
Something similarly transformative may occur when our interest in 
positive autonomy becomes sufficiently high or outweighs negative 
autonomy. When negative autonomy outweighs positive autonomy, factual 
consent may nonetheless be legal non-consent. But when positive autonomy 
outweighs negative, what would be legal non-consent from the perspective 
of negative autonomy may well be legal consent.  
III. Less Conventional Explanations of Hooker 
The conventional types of rape—by physical force, by conditional threat 
of physical force, and intercourse with a person legally incompetent to 
consent—fail to explain Hooker. This section attempts to understand 
Hooker through less conventional approaches.  
First, let us consider intercourse under dire circumstances or 
socioeconomic adversity. For example, suppose that “B’s child will die 
unless she receives expensive surgery for which the state will not pay. A, a 
millionaire proposes to pay for the surgery if B will agree to become his 
mistress.”
36
 We might say that the dire circumstances compel B to 
acquiesce, thereby undermining the voluntariness of her consent. Similarly, 
on that basis, the victim in Hooker also does not consent.  
There are two problems in explaining Hooker through the above “dire 
circumstances” approach. First, the above example is inapposite to Hooker. 
                                                                                                             
potential conflict” but that same-level relationships have “less potential for conflict or 
feelings of unfair treatment with other employees”). 
 35. See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text.  
 36. WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 128.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss1/8
2020]     UNCONDITIONAL COERCION & POSITIVE AUTONOMY 169 
 
 
The above example involves a conditional proposal—A will pay for the 
surgery to B’s child and prevent B’s death only on the condition that B 
becomes A’s mistress. However, as discussed above, the coercion in 
Hooker is unconditional. One might claim that it is the dire circumstances 
and not the conditional proposal that compels B’s acquiescence. But the 
dire circumstances alone—if there were no proposal from A to pay for B’s 
child’s surgery and save B’s life—would surely not compel B to do 
anything with A. 
Second, a number of commentators find it at least plausible that dire 
circumstances and adverse or unjust social circumstances that would 
normally obviate voluntary consent may nevertheless allow a finding of 
consent so as to protect positive autonomy.
37
 The choices such victims 
make should be respected. Denying the victim’s choice as valid and 
consensual might well make the victim’s already difficult plight even 
worse.
38
 Similarly, we might well view the victim in Hooker as consenting. 
That protects her positive autonomy and does not make her already horrific 
plight any worse. As a result, the dire circumstances approach also does not 
supply a clear basis to explain Hooker.  
Another less conventional approach is from Peter Westen. Westen 
contrasts wrongful threats (which are conditional in nature) from 
“‘wrongful oppression’, which is unconditional in nature.”
39
 Westen 
provides the following account: 
‘[W]rongful oppression’ exerts pressure upon S, not by causing S 
to believe that she can prevent her position from worsening by 
acquiescing to x, but rather by causing S to believe that her 
position is such that given the circumstances in which she finds 




                                                                                                             
 37. SCHULHOFER, supra note 2, at 107; WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 128 (“We may 
grant that poor women do not have enough options and that society has been unjust to them 
in not extending more options, while nonetheless respecting and honoring the choices they 
actually make in reduced circumstances.”) (quoting Martha C. Nussbaum, “Whether from 
Reason or Prejudice”: Taking Money for Bodily Services, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 693, 721 
(1998)).  
 38. SCHULHOFER, supra note 2, at 107.  
 39. WESTEN, supra note 10, at 184.  
 40. Id. 
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A victim’s (or S’s) consent to intercourse is negated by wrongful 
oppression when a perpetrator reduces S to a worse position than the 
criminal offense of rape “allows a person to reduce S as a basis for inducing 
her to acquiesce to x . . . [and] S prefers to acquiesce to x rather than not.”
41
 
Westen applies this to Hooker as follows: 
[The defendant caused the victim] to acquiesce to sexual 
intercourse by unconditionally placing her in a position in which 
she preferred captivity with sexual intercourse to captivity 
without sexual intercourse—a position that was worse than the 
position in which the California offense of rape allows a man to 
place a woman as a basis upon which to elicit acquiescence to 
sexual intercourse with himself or another.
42
 
Though not relying on conditional coercion, Westen’s approach would 
suffer from the other problems besetting the dire circumstances approach. It 
would insufficiently value and protect the victim’s positive autonomy. As 
Schulhofer notes, denying the victim’s choice under dire circumstances as 
valid and consensual may make the victim’s horrific plight even worse.
43
 It 
may victimize victims twice—first by the horrific conditions and then 
second by effectively eliminating the means by which they choose to 
ameliorate their horrific conditions. 
Yet another less conventional approach is the view that consensual 
intercourse between men and women is nearly impossible. Catharine 
MacKinnon and others argue that the combined conditions of gender 
discrimination and socioeconomic inequities in our present society may 
preclude the possibility of consent between men and women.
44
 Under this 
                                                                                                             
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 185. 
 43. SCHULHOFER, supra note 2, at 107. 
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[hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY] (“[R]ape is defined as distinct from intercourse, 
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view, the privileged position of men and the inequitable position of women 
renders intercourse with men inherently coercive to women. These scholars 
maintain that women simply cannot, or generally do not, genuinely consent 
to intercourse with men.
45
 Even in a marriage, or perhaps especially within 
a marriage, women cannot genuinely consent to intercourse with men. To 
these scholars, the institution of marriage is viewed as essentially a 
legalized form of coercive prostitution. Therefore, because of economic and 
gender inequities in our society, women are forced to marry in order to 
secure economic security. Wives trade intercourse for economic security; 
husbands trade economic security for intercourse.
46
  
If nearly all intercourse between men and women is nonconsensual due 
to gender and economic inequities, then a fortiori the intercourse in Hooker 
between kidnapper and captive is nonconsensual. Hooker is merely an 
extreme example of the inherently coercive relations between men and 
women throughout our society, even in seemingly loving and committed 
marriages and long-term relationships. If true, then the inherent 
coerciveness of heterosexuality in our society does provide a basis to 
explain the result in Hooker.  
To an even greater degree than Westen’s account, the above approach of 
MacKinnon and others perhaps too greatly diminishes our positive 
autonomy. True, by treating nearly all heterosexual intercourse as 
nonconsensual and thus rape, it protects our negative autonomy exceedingly 
well. But it not only violates our positive autonomy, it nearly completely 
eliminates it. 
  
                                                                                                             
don’t fight back, women who are sexually desirable) are depicted and understood as having, 
in effect, no right or entitlement to the physical security or integrity of their own bodies 
against violent sexual assault.”); see also id. at 242 (“Catharine MacKinnon’s most powerful 
and most important insight, to date, is simply that violence and the threat of it, in such a 
world [i.e., our world], underscore all heterosexuality; violence becomes central to the 
nature of sex.”).  
 45. ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 125–26 (1987) (“[M]en have social, economic, 
political, and physical power over women[, and] all men have some kinds of power over all 
women . . . .”); MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 44, at 173 (viewing “sexuality as 
a social sphere of male power to which forced sex is paradigmatic”).  
 46. Cf. David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 445 (2000) (“Of 
course, men often ‘use their economic superiority to gain sexual advantages,’ but women 
often use their sexual superiority to gain economic advantages. So who is the extortionist?”).  
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As opposed to conditional coercion, the unconditional imposition of 
horrific circumstances poses a difficult conceptual challenge for modern 
understandings of consent and the law of rape. Though imposition of 
unconditional coercion might intuitively demand that we regard the 
victim’s consent negated and the perpetrator be punished, conventional 
approaches to the law of rape, premised on coercion being conditional, 
struggle to establish any resulting intercourse as nonconsensual. Is 
conditionality inherent in the very nature of coercion? If the horrific 
circumstances are to be imposed regardless of whether the victim 
acquiesces to intercourse, in what way did the horrific circumstances induce 
the acquiescence? Some less conventional approaches perhaps can account 
for unconditional coercion negating consent. But they may do so at too 
great a cost. While protecting our negative autonomy, they violate our 
positive autonomy. Denying a victim’s choice as valid and consensual 
when made under unconditional horrific circumstances may make the 
victim’s already difficult plight even worse. By perhaps precluding victims’ 
only way to somewhat ameliorate the horrific circumstances, the victims 
may be victimized twice—first by the perpetrator’s imposition of horrific 
circumstances and second by the diminution of their positive autonomy. 
But recognizing and honoring victims’ positive autonomy is intuitively 
unpalatable by allowing very culpable and blameworthy rapists to go 
unpunished. How the law of rape should treat unconditional coercion poses 
a dilemma of difficult trade-offs between negative and positive autonomy 
as well as between giving culpable rapists their just deserts and victims’ 
rights. Should we let the blameworthy rapist go unpunished so as to not 
further victimize the victim? Or should we sacrifice the victim’s interests so 
as to give culpable rapists their just deserts? 
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